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Abstract
This paper reexamines the paradoxical aspect of the electronic mail game
(Rubinstein, 1989). The electronic mail game is a coordination game with
payoff uncertainty. At a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game, players
cannot achieve the desired coordination of actions even when a high order
of mutual knowledge of payoff functions obtains. We want to make explicit
the role of knowledge about rationality of players, not only that of payoff
functions. For this purpose, we use an extended version of the belief system
model developed by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). We propose a cer-
tain way of embedding the electronic mail game in an belief system. And we
show that for rational players to coordinate their actions, for any embedding
belief systems, it is necessary that the upper bound order of mutual knowl-
edge of payoff functions exceeds the upper bound order of mutual knowledge
of rationality. This result implies that under common knowledge of ratio-
nality, the coordination never occurs, which is similar to Rubinstein’s result.
We point out, however, that there exists a class embedding belief systems
for which the above condition is also sufficient for the desired coordination.
JEL Classification— C72, D81, D82
Keywords— electronic mail game, mutual knowledge, common knowl-
edge, rationality, interactive belief system.
∗This paper is a largely revised version of our paper entitled “The role of small irrationality
in communication and strategic decisions: An example with the electronic mail game” (2002).
An earlier version was presented at the International Conference on Game Theory and Its Ap-
plications held at the Taj Mahal hotel in Mumbai, India on 8–10 January of 2003. We thank
participants of the above conference, and the seminars at Hokkaido University and Otaru Uni-
versity of Commerce. And the first author thanks Akihiko Matsui for motivating the research.
†Corresponding author. Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. 6-1
Mihogaoka Ibaraki Osaka 567-0047 JAPAN. E-mail: takamiya@iser.osaka-u.ac.jp.
‡Division of Computer Science, Graduate School of Information Science and Technology,
Hokkaido University. Kita14 Nishi9 Sapporo 060-0814 JAPAN.
0 Introduction
The purpose of this research is to study the role of knowledge about players’
rationality in the context of the electronic mail game, which was proposed by
Rubinstein (1989). We analyze knowledge of rationality by an extended version
of the model called an interactive belief system introduced by Aumann and
Brandenburger (1995).
The electronic mail game, the e-mail game for short, (Rubinstein, 1989)
is a paradoxical example regarding risky coordination of actions under incomplete
information. In this game, two players have to play a coordination game whose
payoff matrices are randomly chosen from two possible types, say α and β. Both
players has two available actions, say A and B. When the true payoff matrix is α,
the players coordinating their actions on (A,A) is profitable to both. But when the
true payoff matrix is β, the profitable coordination is (B,B). In both cases, when
one player chooses A and the other takes B, the former neither gains nor loses
whereas the latter suffers a loss. Thus the coordination on (B,B) is risky. The
players share the information about the true payoff matrix, α or β, according to
the following “e-mail communication” scenario: Only one of the players is initially
informed of the true payoff matrix. Then they share the information of the true
payoff matrix by sending signals to each other before taking actions. If the true
payoff matrix is α, then no signal is to be sent, and the players will go for taking
actions immediately. But if it is β, the informed player (say Player1) sends a
signal to the other player (Player2). And if Player2 has received the signal, then
she acknowledges the signal by sending another signal to Player1. Then if Player1
has received this signal, he sends back another signal, and so on. Each signal,
however, may be lost and never arrives with a small probability. Each player
sends signals automatically. It is not a strategic decision whether or not one
player sends a signal. So once β realizes, both players continue to send signals by
turns until one signal gets lost. And once a signal has been lost, the communication
stops and the players will take actions. It is interpreted that the more signals the
players exchange, the higher is the order (level) of knowledge that “the true payoff
matrix is β” the players share. The e-mail game is formulated as a Bayesian game,
in which a type of a player is identified with the number of signals that the player
has sent in the communication phase. A strategy of a player in this context is a
plan of action, which associates one action with each type of the player.
The major problem about the e-mail game is whether the players can achieve
the desired coordination (B,B) when the true payoff matrix is β, provided that
Player1 is to take the action A when the true payoff matrix is α. (Recall that
Player1 is always to know the true payoff matrix.) It should be noted that we are
not interested in the case where Player1 chooses B for the payoff matrix α. In
this case, even if the players can coordinate on (B,B) for the payoff matrix β, the
coordination must be at the expense of the failure of the coordination on (A,A)
for the the payoff matrix α. This is clearly undesirable since the payoff matrix α
is more likely to occur. Also, when the true payoff matrix is α, taking the action
A is weakly dominant to Player1. So there is no benefit to Player1 from taking
the action B.
Rubinstein (1989) searched for the possibility of the (B,B) coordination in
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Nash equilibrium. He showed that there is only one Nash equilibrium in which
Player1 takes the action A when the true payoff matrix is α, and in that equilibrium
both players take the action A no matter how many signals have been exchanged.
Thus in equilibrium, they cannot coordinate on (B,B) when the payoff matrix is
β regardless of the order of mutual knowledge of the payoff matrix as long as it
is finite. The (B,B) coordination would be possible if it were common knowledge
that the true payoff matrix is β. Thus a finite order mutual knowledge works very
differently than common knowledge however high its order is. Rubinstein regarded
the above observation as paradoxical. In his paper, he asks: “What would you do
if the number on your screen is 17? It is hard to imagine that when L is slightly
above M and ε [the probability for a signal to get lost] is small a player will not
play B.”1 And he remarks: “Systematic explanation of our intuition that we will
play B when the number on our screen is 17 [. . . ] is definitely a most intriguing
question.”
We want to rethink this e-mail game “paradox” by examining the effect of
knowledge about rationality of players. Since the “paradox” is concerned
with the behavior at a Nash equilibrium, the role of knowledge about rationality
is not explicitly considered. The standard assumption of game theory says that
it is implicit that players’ rationality is common knowledge unless it is specified.
However, common knowledge of rationality is highly idealized assumption and
hardly satisfied in “real-life” environments. So if we regard the behavior at a
Nash equilibrium as counterintuitive, we have to explicitly test the effect of (the
lack of) common knowledge of rationality. In this paper, we look at whether
the desired coordination behavior is possible when the order of mutual knowledge
about rationality is bounded to finite numbers.
To analyze knowledge about rationality, we will use an extended version of
an interactive belief system as in Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). An
interactive belief system is an formal apparatus to analyze players’ epistemic states.
In this system, each player faces one of possible types, which corresponds to a
configuration of all the parameters relevant to the player including possible payoff
functions, an action to be taken, and knowledge and beliefs. Each player, for
each type, has a probability distribution (belief) over the other player’s types with
which one can derive all information that the player possesses at each type. In
particular, a type also specifies whether the player is rational or not at that type.
(We will explain how we define players’ rationality shortly.) Thus one draws one
player’s information about the rationality of the other player, and information
about the other player’s information about the rationality of the player, and so
on.
In our analysis, players are subject to two kinds of uncertainty: One is players’
rationality. The other is payoff functions (the type of the true payoff matrix).
The rationality of players in this context should be concerned with the choice of
strategies (i.e. plans of action) as of a Bayesian game, rather than the choice of
actions, which the players choose in advance of the “e-mail communication.” We
assumes that players have two distinct sources of information which are indepen-
dent of each other. One source is the “e-mail communication,” where they receive
knowledge about payoff functions. From the other source, the players obtain all
1In Rubinstein’s original scenario, players’ types are displayed on their computer screens.
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other information, including knowledge about the rationality of the players. This
is because since the strategic interaction is “one-shot” in the e-mail game, there is
no possibility that a player learns about the other player’s characteristics through
the interaction. Thus we have to assume that knowledge about players’ rationality
comes from somewhere else.
To describe the above setting formally, we embed the e-mail game into
an interactive belief system in the following manner. We split each player’s
type into two components, rationality type and payoff type. The payoff types
are identical with the types in the e-mail game as a Bayesian game. Also, their
probability distributions are the same. Payoff functions at each type profile de-
pends only on the payoff types and are identical with the true payoff matrix at the
corresponding type in the e-mail game. Payoff types summarize the information
associated with the “e-mail communication.”
On the other hand, rationality types represent all the information from some-
where other than the “e-mail communication.” Since we assume this information
comes from a distinct and independent source, the probability distribution of ra-
tionality types and that of payoff types are independent of each other. In the
interactive belief system, one type of a player is associated with one action. But
one rationality type is associated with one strategy (since without the information
represented by payoff types, players cannot pin down to a single action.)
The standard definition says that a player is called rational at a type if he
maximizes the expectation of his payoff with respect to the belief at that type.
Thus in this definition, rationality is a question of whether the action to be taken
at a certain type is payoff-maximizing or not. However, as we have mentioned
above, for our purpose, we want to call a player rational if his choice of strategies,
rather than that of actions, is payoff-maximizing. Thus the relevant definition of
rationality should be contingent only upon rationality types. This explains why
we call them “rationality types.” We define that a player is called rational at a
type if he is rational in the sense of the standard definition at every payoff type
given the rationality type that he is at now.
In short, players’ types consist of two independent components: rationality
types contain the information about the choice of strategies and so about ratio-
nality, whereas payoff types contain the information about the true payoff matrix
and actions resulting from strategies.
The results of our analysis suggests the “paradox” of the e-mail game at least
partially results from the strength of common knowledge of rationality. The first
result of this paper says that in any interactive belief system embedding the
e-mail game, when the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of ratio-
nality is at least as large as that of mutual knowledge of the true payoff
matrix, the desired coordination on (B,B) by rational players must fail.
Thus when common knowledge of rationality (which has the infinite order) is as-
sumed, the paradoxical behavior as observed in Rubinstein (1989) follows. But
our second result points out that there are some interactive belief systems
in which when the above condition does not hold, rational players do
coordinate their action on (B,B). Since the order of mutual knowledge of the
true payoff matrix is determined by how many signals has been exchanged in the
“e-mail communication,” these results suggest that the desired coordination may
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occur if a particular amount of communication has taken place, and that it does
not occur if not. We consider that this observation fits our intuition of how we
would actually play this game in Rubinstein’s original scenario.
The direction of research that we take was first proposed by Aumann (1992).
He used a model called an information system, which is a special case of an inter-
active belief system. (In information systems, payoff functions do not vary across
types.) With his model, Aumann examined implications of replacing common
knowledge of rationality with mutual knowledge of rationality of finite orders. By
an example based on a version of the “centipede game” (Rosenthal 1982, Megiddo
1986), he demonstrated that a minute departure from common knowledge of ra-
tionality may resolve the “backward induction paradox.” Basically, we follow the
same method as in Aumann’s paper in analyzing players’ rationality in the e-mail
game. However, the major departure of our analysis from Aumann’s is that we
analyze an incomplete information game (the e-mail game) whereas Aumann dealt
with strategic games. This is the reason why we need a more elaborate model.
Further, more importantly, we can analyze the relationship between two kinds
of knowledge (payoff functions and rationality).
To the best of our knowledge, most of the preceding literature on the e-mail
game following Rubinstein (1989) further examines implications of the lack of com-
mon knowledge of payoff functions by considering variations on (or generalization
of) the original game (such as Binmore and Samuelson (2001), Dimitri (2003),
(2004), Morris (2001)). However, most of them do not directly refer to players’
rationality.2 On the contrary, we will not change the original setting of the game
at all. And we explicitly consider epistemic states of players’ rationality. We con-
sider that the present work offers a direct resolution to the “paradox” of the e-mail
game.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 1 introduces the basic concepts,
including the formal presentation of the e-mail game, interactive belief systems,
and embedding of the e-mail game into an interactive belief system. Section 2
states and proves the results. Section 3 concludes the paper with some remarks.
1 Basic concepts
1.1 The Electronic mail game
The electronic mail game (the e-mail game, henceforth) was introduced by
Rubinstein (1989). Given the underlying scenario provided in Introduction, here
we present only a formal description. (See Rubinstein’s paper for details.) The
game is formulated as a Bayesian game, G = (A1, A2;T1, T2;u1, u2; ρ). There are
two players, Players1 and 2. Each Player i (i = 1, 2) has two available actions,
namely A and B. Ai denotes the action set {A,B}.
For each player, a payoff type is a non negative integer 0, 1, 2, · · ·.3 That
Player i’s payoff type equals ti means that when the “e-mail communication” has
2One exception is Dulleck (2002), which introduced boundedly rational players who cannot
count the number of signals correctly.
3We avoid the term “types” here not to arise confusion with “types” in the context of “inter-
active belief systems” to be introduced in Section 1.2.
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ended, he has sent signals ti times. Ti denotes the set of payoff types of Player
i. That is, Ti = {0, 1, 2, · · ·}. Denote by ρ the probability distribution over the
set of payoff type profiles, which is depicted in Table 2. Note that for any payoff
type profile (t1, t2), the probability of (t1, t2) is positive if and only if t1 = t2 or
t1 = t2 + 1. ε is the probability with which an e-mail signal gets lost. Assume
p, ε < 12 .
There are two possible types of payoff matrices, α and β. These payoff matrices
are depicted in Table 1. α occurs with probability 1−p, and β does with p. Assume
L > M > 0. And the payoff type profile (t1, t2) equals (0, 0) if and only if the true
payoff matrix is α. And any other payoff type profile having a positive probability
realizes only if the true payoff matrix is β. Since our analysis is in expectation
term throughout, the payoff matrices associated with the payoff type profiles with
0-probability play no role so that they can be arbitrary.
ui (i = 1, 2) is the payoff function of Player i, ui : A1×A2×T1×T2 → R. Given
the relationship between the payoff types and the two payoff matrices, abusing the
notation, we sometimes regard ui as a function defined on A1 ×A2 × {α, β}.
A strategy of Player i is a function from Ti to the set of actions Ai.
It is clear from the payoff matrices that the two players want to coordinate
their actions on (A,A) when the true payoff matrix is α, and on (B,B) when it is
β. We are interested in the problem of whether the players can achieve the desired
coordination (B,B) when the true payoff matrix is β, provided that Player1 is to
take the action A when the true payoff matrix is α. We will not be concerned
with the case where Player1 chooses B for the payoff matrix α. In this case, even
if the players can coordinate on (B,B) for the payoff matrix β, the coordination
must be at the expense of the failure of the coordination on (A,A) for the the
payoff matrix α. This is clearly undesirable since the payoff matrix α is more
likely to occur. Also since in the payoff matrix α A is the weakly dominant action
to Player1, there is no benefit to Player1 from taking B.
Rubinstein (1989) proved that a strategy profile (σ1, σ2) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium and satisfies σ1(0) = A if and only if for each i = 1, 2 and each
t = 0, 1, 2, · · ·, σi(t) = A.
Table 1: The payoff matrices of the e-mail game
α
probability (1− p) > 12
A B
A M,M 0,−L
B −L, 0 0, 0
β
probability p < 12
A B
A 0, 0 0,−L
B −L, 0 M,M
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Table 2: The probability distribution ρ over the set of payoff type profiles T1× T2
Payoff types of Player1/Payoff types of Player2
0 1 2 3 · · ·
0 (1− p)
1 εp ε(1− ε)p
2 ε(1− ε)2p ε(1− ε)3p
3 ε(1− ε)4p ε(1− ε)5p
...
. . . . . .
1.2 Interactive belief system
An interactive belief system is formal apparatus to analyze players’ knowledge and
beliefs. The following is an extension of the definition by Aumann and Branden-
burger (1995). Here we consider only two person cases. An interactive belief
system is a list (A1, A2;S1, S2;a1,a2; g1, g2;µ). Here Ai (i = 1, 2) are the action
sets, which are nonempty. Si (i = 1, 2) is the set of types of Player i. A type
of Player i represents a specification of all the relevant parameters to Player i.
Assume Si is a nonempty countable set.
Call any element of S1 × S2 a state of the world (SOW, for short). Denote
a SOW (s1, s2) by s, (s′1, s
′
2) by s
′ and so on. Denote by Ω the set S1 × S2.
ai is a function from Si to Ai (i = 1, 2). This means that Player i takes the
action ai(si) when his type is si.
gi (i = 1, 2) is a function from Ω to the set of real-valued functions defined on
A1 × A2. (Aumann and Brandenburger define the domain of gi to be Si, not Ω.
This is the only difference to our formulation.) For each s ∈ Ω, gi(s) represents
the payoff function of Player i when the SOW is s.
µ is a probability distribution over Ω. We postulate the common prior
assumption.4 One derives each player’s knowledge and beliefs at each type from
this single probability distribution. Call a SOW possible if it is assigned non-zero
probability by µ. Denote by Ω? the set of the possible SOWs. For the sake of
simplicity, assume that for any i = 1, 2 and for any si ∈ Si, µ assigns the set
{si} × Sj , where i 6= j, a non-zero probability.
Since (Ω, µ) is a (countable) probability space, we can regard the functions
ai, gi as random variables.
Let us introduce concepts of interactive knowledge and beliefs. Let E be a
subset of Ω. Call E an event. Let s ∈ Ω. Then say that at s, Player i believes
E with probability µ(E | si). This defines players’ belief. In particular, if µ(E |
si) = 1, we say that Player i knows E at s. This defines players’ knowledge.5
4Aumann and Brandenburger do not include the common prior assumption in the definition.
There is a numerous papers on the reasonability of the assumption. We do not intend to argue
about it here.
5We do not treat knowledge in the sense of absolute certainty.
6
These definitions allow us to say like “Player i knows (or believes) E at si” with
si ∈ Si.
Let E be an event. Denote the event “Player i knows an event E” by KiE,
i.e. KiE = {s ∈ Ω | µ(E | si) = 1}. Let K1E denote K1E ∩K2E. Also let K2E
denote K1K1E, K3E denote K1K2E, and so on.
Let E be an event, and s ∈ Ω. Let m be a positive integer. Call E m-th order
mutual knowledge at s if s ∈ KmE. If E is m-th order mutual knowledge with
m ≥ 2 at s, then E is also (m − 1)-th order mutual knowledge at s (Lemma 5
below). Suppose E is mutual knowledge of some order at s. Then we say that m
is the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of E at s if s ∈ KmE and
s 6∈ Km+1E. Denote by #MKE(s) the upper bound order of mutual knowledge
of E at s. For convenience, define #MKE(s) = 0 if E is not mutual knowledge
of any order at s. If E is m-th order mutual knowledge for any positive integer m
at s, we say that E is common knowledge at s. Denote by CKE the event “E
is common knowledge.” That is, CKE = K1E ∩K2E ∩K3E ∩ · · ·. For the case
s ∈ CKE, define #MKR(s) =∞.
Let s ∈ Ω. Call Player i rational at s if the action ai(si) that the player takes
at s maximizes the expectation of his payoff given his posterior, that is, if it holds
true that ai(si) ∈ arg max ai∈AiEgi(ai,aj | si).6
For our purpose, we need to extend the above definition of rationality to the
following one. Let a partition Q of Ω be given. Let s ∈ Ω. Call Player i rational
at s relative to Q if he is rational is at any SOW in the cell of Q which contains
s. This definition of rationality is stronger than the one in the above. So to speak,
the first definition is “pointwise,” and the second one is “setwise.” In the next
subsection, we will see the “setwise” definition of rationality is relevant to our
purpose.
Note that by these definitions, the rationality of a player is contingent only
upon his types (regardless of “pointwise” or “setwise”). Thus each player knows
whether he is rational or not at any type. Also we may say like “Player i is rational
(or rational relative to Q) at si” with si ∈ Si.
We give some preliminary lemmas. Proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 are straightfor-
ward thus omitted.
Lemma 1: Let {Ej} be a family of events.
⋂
j KiEj = Ki(
⋂
j Ej).
Lemma 2: If E ⊂ F , then KiE ⊂ KiF .
It is immediate from Lemma 1 that for any positive integer m,
⋂
j K
mEj =
Km(
⋂
j Ej).
Note that since we have defined “knowledge” to be “belief with probability 1,”
in general it is not true that KiE ⊂ E (i.e. if Player i knows E, then E is true).
But it holds true that KiE ∩ Ω? ⊂ E ∩ Ω?.
There is a class of events such that KiE = E (i.e. Player i knows E if and only
if E is true). For i = 1, 2, let Pi be the partition of Ω such that any two SOW s
and s′ are in the same cell of Pi if and only if si = s′i. Denote by Fi the σ-field
6Here and in the sequel, E is the operator of expectation.
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generated by Pi. (i.e. Fi consists of all the unions of elements of Pi.)
Lemma 3: If E ∈ Fi, then KiE = E.
Proof: (i) We prove KiE ⊂ E. Suppose that there exists a SOW s such that
s ∈ KiE and s 6∈ E. Then the former implies µ(E | si) = 1. The latter implies
({si} × Sj) ∩ E = ∅, where i 6= j, since E ∈ Fi. This implies µ(E | si) = 0. This
is a contradiction.
(ii) We prove E ⊂ KiE. Suppose that there exists a SOW s such that s ∈ E
and s 6∈ KiE. Then the latter implies µ(E | si) 6= 1. The former implies
({si}×Sj)∩E = {si}×Sj , where i 6= j, since E ∈ Fi. This implies µ(E | si) = 1.
This is a contradiction.
2
Important examples of such events E that E ∈ Fi are the event “Player i is
rational,” and the event “Player i takes the action A (or B).” Thus Player i knows
he is rational if and only if he is actually rational. And Player i knows he takes
the action A (or B, resp.) if and only if he actually takes A (or B, resp.). Also it
is important to note that for any event E, KiE ∈ Fi. Then the following lemma
is immediate.
Lemma 4: KiE = KiKiE.
Lemma 5: Let m ≥ 2. KmE ⊂ Km−1E.
Proof: By induction regarding m.
(i) Let m = 2. K2E = K1(K1E ∩ K2E). Then by Lemma 1, this equals
K1K1E ∩K1K2E ∩K2K1E ∩K2K2E. By Lemma 4, this equals K1E ∩K2E ∩
K1K2E ∩K2K1E. Clearly this is a subset of K1E ∩K2E = K1E.
(ii) Suppose that for some k ≥ 2, KkE ⊂ Kk−1E. We have Kk+1E = K1KkE =
K1K
kE∩K2KkE. Then by the induction hypothesis and Lemma 2, this is a sub-
set of K1Kk−1E ∩K2Kk−1E, which equals KkE. Thus we have Kk+1E ⊂ KkE.
2
Lemma 6: KmCKE = CKE.
Proof: KmCKE = Km(K1E ∩ K2E ∩ · · ·). Lemma 1 implies this equals
Km+1E∩Km+2E∩· · ·. Lemma 5 implies this equals K1E∩K2E∩· · · = CKE. 2
The following lemma will be useful in proving some of the results to appear in
the next section. To state the lemma, we need one more definition. Let s, s′ ∈ Ω?.
A path from s to s′ is a sequence (sν)mν=0 with each s
ν ∈ Ω? satisfying
(i) s0 = s and sm = s′; and
(ii) for some i = 1 or 2, letting i 6= j, s0i = s1i , s1j = s2j , s2i = s3i , s3j = s4j · · ·.
Call the number m the length of the path. Note that there are infinitely many
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paths from s to s′, for any given s and s′ in Ω?.7 Also note that by definition a
path must lie within the set of the possible SOWs. Let s 7→ s′ denote a path
from from s to s′. Denote by | s 7→ s′ | the length of s 7→ s′.
Lemma 7: Let E be an event. And let s ∈ Ω?. Then s ∈ KmE if and only if for
any s′ ∈ Ω? \ E, there does not exist s 7→ s′ with | s 7→ s′ |≤ m.
Proof: By induction regarding m.
(i) Let m = 1. Let s ∈ Ω?.
(if) Suppose s 6∈ K1E. Then for some i = 1, 2, s 6∈ KiE. Thus there exists
some s′ ∈ Ω? \E such that s′i = si and µ(s′ | si) > 0. Then (s, s′) is a path whose
length is 1.
(only if) Assume s ∈ K1E. Suppose that for some s′ ∈ Ω? \ E, there exists
s 7→ s′ with | s 7→ s′ |≤ 1. Then since s 6= s′, | s 7→ s′ |= 1. Then by the definition
of paths, µ(s′ | si) > 0 for some i = 1, 2. Thus µ(E | si) 6= 1, that is, s 6∈ KiE.
This implies s 6∈ K1E. This is a contradiction.
(ii) Suppose that for some k ≥ 1, for any event E and any s ∈ Ω?, we have
s ∈ KkE if and only if for any s′ ∈ Ω? \ E, there does not exist s 7→ s′ with
| s 7→ s′ |≤ k.
(if) Let s ∈ Ω?. Suppose s 6∈ Kk+1E. Note that Kk+1E = K1(KkE). Then
by the case (i), for some sˆ ∈ Ω? \ KkE, there exists some path s 7→ sˆ with the
length 1. Also by the induction hypothesis, sˆ ∈ Ω? \KkE implies that for some
s′ ∈ Ω? \ E, there exists some path sˆ 7→ s′ such that | sˆ 7→ s′ |≤ k. This implies
that there exists some path s 7→ s′ such that | s 7→ s′ |≤ k + 1.
(only if) Let s ∈ Ω?. Assume s ∈ Kk+1E. Suppose that for some s′ ∈ Ω? \E,
there exists some path s 7→ s′ such that | s 7→ s′ |≤ k + 1. Denote this path by
(s0, s1, · · · , sl), where s0 = s and sl = s′. Now note that Kk+1E = K1(KkE), and
(s0, s1) is a path with the length 1. Then the case (i) implies s1 ∈ KkE. Then
(s1, s2, · · · , sl) is a path from s1 ∈ KkE to s′ ∈ Ω? \E with the length l−1, which
is not more than k. This contradicts the induction hypothesis.
2
The following Lemma 8 is immediate from Lemma 7 but worth noting.
Lemma 8: Let E be an event, and s, s′ ∈ Ω?. Then if s ∈ CKE and there exists
some s 7→ s′, then s′ ∈ CKE.
Proof: Denote | s 7→ s′ | by m. Suppose s′ 6∈ CKE. Then Lemma 7 implies
s 6∈ KmCKE. By Lemma 6, we have s 6∈ CKE. 2
7For example, let s = s′. Then (s), (s, s), (s, s, s) · · · are all different paths from s to s′.
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1.3 Embedding the e-mail game in an interactive belief sys-
tem
In our analysis, we are concerned with two kinds of players’ knowledge. One is
knowledge about payoff functions which is implicit in the formulation of the e-
mail game. The other is knowledge about rationality of players. We assume that
the two kinds of knowledge are elicited from distinct and independent sources of
information, respectively, for the following reason. We suppose that the rationality
in this context is concerned with the choice of strategies (plans of action), rather
than the choice of actions, which the players make in advance of the “e-mail
communication.” And the “e-mail communication” is an “automatic device” so
the strategic interaction is one-shot, thus it has to be assumed that each player
obtains information about rationality independent of the “e-mail communication.”
The following formulation reflects our viewpoint.
Let the e-mail game G = (A1, A2;T1, T2;u1, u2; ρ) be given. Then an interac-
tive belief system which embeds G (embedding belief system, for short)
is an interactive belief system B(G) = (A1, A2;S1, S2;a1,a2; g1, g2;µ). Here Ai
(i = 1, 2) are taken from G.
Si = T ?i × Ti (i = 1, 2), where Ti is taken from G, and T ?i is a nonempty
countable set. Call an element of T ?i a rationality type, and that of Ti a payoff
type, of Player i. Recall that Ω denotes S1 × S2. Thus Ω = T ?1 × T1 × T ?2 × T2.
Also denote by T the set T1 × T2, and by T ? the set T ?1 × T ?2 . So we denote
(t?1, t1, t
?
2, t2) ∈ Ω by s, (t?′1 , t′1, t?′2 , t′2) by s′ and so on. And similarly denote
t = (t1, t2), t′ = (t′1, t
′
2) ∈ T1 × T2, t? = (t?1, t?2), t?′ = (t?′1 , t?′2 ) ∈ T ?1 × T ?2 and so on.
Let ti (i = 1, 2) denote the functions from Ω to Ti that pick up for each
s ∈ Ω the component ti, i.e. ti(s) = ti for any s ∈ Ω. Also, we define functions
t?i : Ω→ T ?i (i = 1, 2) similarly. Then ti, t?i are regarded as random variables.
Given ρ of G, the probability distribution µ satisfies the following condition:
(1.1) There exists a probability distribution ρ? on T ? that satisfies for any s ∈ Ω,
µ(s) = ρ?(t?)ρ(t).
That is, a rationality type profile and a payoff type profile are independent of
each other when viewed as random variables.
The functions gi (i = 1, 2) satisfy the following.
(1.2) For any s ∈ Ω, if ρ(t) > 0, then gi(s) = ui(·, ·, t1, t2) : A1 ×A2 → R.
That is, rationality types are payoff-irrelevant. And the payoff functions ui of
G are essentially inherited. Given (1.2), by the definition of ui, (g1, g2) takes only
two values, namely (u1(·, ·, α), u2(·, ·, α)) and (u1(·, ·, β), u2(·, ·, β)), for any SOW
s such that ρ(t) > 0. For the former case, say “the true payoff matrix is α,”
and for the latter case, say “the true payoff matrix is β.” Note that these
expressions do not apply to such SOWs s that ρ(t) = 0. We are not concerned
with the values of (g1, g2) for such SOWs. Because they are not possible SOWs,
and our analysis is in terms of expectation throughout.
Let Q? be the partition of Ω such that any two SOWs s and s′ are in the same
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cell of Q? if and only if t? = t?′. Denote by F? the σ-field generated by Q?. Then
E ∈ F? means that E is an event which is contingent only upon the component
t? of SOWs s. In other words, such events E are those events that are determined
independent of the “e-mail communication.” The condition (1.1) implies that for
any event E, E ∈ F? implies KiE ∈ F? thus KmE,CKE ∈ F?.
The rationality concept relevant to this context is the “setwise” one that we
have introduced in Section 1.2. In the following, we are concerned with each
player’s rationality relative toQ?. So unless noted, we say that Player i is rational
at s meaning that Player i is rational at s relative to Q?. Thus whether Player
i is rational or not at a SOW s depends only on the component t?i of s. So we say
like “Player i is rational at t?i (or at t
?).” This definition of rationality explains
why we call elements of T ?i “rationality types.” When we want to refer to the
“pointwise” definition, we will use phrases such as “pointwise rationality.”
The reason for adopting the above definition of rationality should be clear.
As mentioned, we do not consider rationality to be an attribute of actions but of
strategies (plans of action) in this context. So it should be determined independent
of the “e-mail communication.” Thus the relevant definition of rationality has to
be independent of the component t of SOWs s.
In the sequel, we are interested in three kinds of events: The first is the event
that “the true payoff matrix is β.” Denote this event by Pβ . Formally, Pβ =
{s ∈ Ω | ρ(t) > 0 and (t1, t2) 6= (0, 0)}. The second is the event that “both
players are rational.” Denote this event by R. Note that R ∈ F?. The third is
the event “if Player1’s payoff type is 0, then he chooses the action A.” Denote this
event by E˜. Formally, E˜ = {s ∈ Ω | t1 = 0 ⇒ a1(s1) = A}. Note that E˜ ∈ F?.
Significance of Pβ and R is evident. The motivation for introducing E˜ is explained
after stating Theorem 1 in the next section.
2 Results
2.1 General results
Throughout this subsection, let an embedding belief system B(G) be given. Lemma
9 below formally states the intended interpretation of the “e-mail communication”
of the e-mail game. (See Rubinstein (1989).)
Lemma 9: Let s ∈ Ω?. If t1 ≥ 1, then #MKPβ(s) = t1 + t2 − 1.
Proof: Index those elements of T that ρ gives positive probabilities as follows:
Let t ∈ T . Let h = t1 + t2. Then refer to t as t(h).
Let s ∈ Ω?. Then say t’s index is h i.e. t = t(h). Consider a path (sν)hν=0 such
that
s0 = s,
s1 = (t?1, t
(h−1)
1 , t
?
2, t
(h−1)
2 ),
s2 = (t?1, t
(h−2)
1 , t
?
2, t
(h−2)
2 ),
...
sh = (t?1, t
(0)
1 , t
?
2, t
(0)
2 ).
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Note that t(0) = (0, 0). Then clearly, s0, s1, · · · , sh−1 ∈ Pβ and sh 6∈ Pβ . Clearly,
this is the shortest path from s to some possible SOW outside Pβ , and its length
is h. Then Lemma 7 implies #MKPβ(s) = h− 1 = t1 + t2 − 1. 2
Lemma 10: Let s ∈ Ω. Then
(i) if Player1 is rational at s, t1 ≥ 1 and a1(s1) = B, then there exists some
s′ ∈ Ω? such that s1 = s′1, t′2 = t1 − 1 and a2(s′2) = B; and
(ii) if Player2 is rational at s, a1(s2) = B, then there exists some s′ ∈ Ω? such
that s2 = s′2, t
′
1 = t2 and a1(s
′
1) = B.
Proof:
Proof of (i): Let s ∈ Ω satisfy the assumptions in the statement. Suppose that
for any s′ ∈ Ω? such that s1 = s′1 and t′2 = t1 − 1, we have a2(s′2) = A. Then
since we assumed a1(s1) = B, we have Eg1(a1,a2 | s1) = 11+(1−ε)u1(B,A;β) +
1−ε
1+(1−ε)
∑
t˜?2∈T?2 ,t˜2=t1 u1(B,a2(t˜
?
2, t˜2);β)ρ
?(t˜?2 | t1) ≤ 11+(1−ε) (−L) + 1−ε1+(1−ε)M <
0. On the other hand, Eg1(A,a2 | s1) = 0. This contradicts the rationality of
Player1.
Proof of (ii): Let s ∈ Ω satisfy the assumptions in the statement. We have two
cases, namely the case t2 ≥ 1 and the case t2 = 0.
(a) Assume t2 ≥ 1. Suppose that for any s′ ∈ Ω? such that s2 = s′2 and t′1 = t2,
we have a1(s′1) = A. Then since we assumed a2(s2) = B, we have Eg2(a1,a2 |
s2) = 11+(1−ε)u2(A,B;β) +
1−ε
1+(1−ε)
∑
t˜?1∈T?1 ,t˜1=t2+1 u2(a1(t˜
?
1, t˜1), B;β)ρ
?(t˜?1 | t2) ≤
1
1+(1−ε) (−L) + 1−ε1+(1−ε)M < 0. On the other hand, Eg2(a1, A | s˜2) = 0. This
contradicts the rationality of Player2.
(b) Assume t2 = 0. Suppose that for any s′ ∈ Ω? such that s2 = s′2 and t′1 = t2,
we have a1(s′1) = A. Then since we assumed a2(s2) = B, we have Eg2(a1,a2 |
s2) = 1−p(1−p)+εpu2(A,B;α)+
εp
(1−p)+εp
∑
t˜?1∈T?1 ,t˜1=t2+1 u2(a1(t˜
?
1, t˜1), B;β)ρ
?(t˜?1 | t2) ≤
1−p
(1−p)+εp (−L) + εp(1−p)+εpM < 0. (Recall that p < 12 .) On the other hand,
Eg2(a1, A | s˜2) = 0. This contradicts the rationality of Player2.
2
The following is the first of our main results.
Theorem 1: Let s ∈ Ω?. Assume that each player is rational at s. And assume
s ∈ CKE˜. Then if ai(s) = B for each i = 1, 2, then #MKPβ(s) > #MKR(s).
Note that Theorem 1 is concerned only with what happens at possible SOWs.
In Theorem 1, we assume that each player is rational at s. This assumption can
be replaced with the requirement that s is such that t1, t2 ≥ 1. (If replaced,
however, we would be silent about the case t = (1, 0).) Because, if s satisfies
t1, t2 ≥ 1, then #MKPβ(s) ≥ 1. And if at least one player is not rational at s,
then #MKR(s) = 0. So we have #MKPβ(s) > #MKR(s) trivially. Thus in the
case of t1, t2 ≥ 1, it is superfluous to assume that both players are rational.
In words, Theorem 1 says that at any possible SOW, provided that it is common
knowledge that [Player1 chooses the action A if the true payoff matrix is α], it
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is a necessary condition for rational players to achieve the (B,B) coordination
that [the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of “the true payoff matrix is β”
exceeds the upper bound order of mutual knowledge of rationality].
The motivation for the assumption s ∈ CKE˜ in Theorem 1 should be made
clear. As we have discussed, we are interested in whether players can coordinate
their actions on (B,B) when the true payoff matrix is β provided that Player1
chooses A for the payoff matrix α. Thus we exclude the cases where there is a
possibility that Player1 takes the action B when the true payoff matrix is α. This
entails common knowledge of the event E˜.
The significance of Theorem 1 is that it relates the possibility of the (B,B)
coordination to the comparison between the orders of mutual knowledge about
players’ rationality and the true payoff matrix. In particular, the result opens
the possibility for the (B,B) coordination as a result of rational plans of action
when the order of mutual knowledge of rationality is bounded. We search for this
possibility in the next subsection.
It should be noted that the condition that Theorem 1 gives is necessary but
not sufficient for the (B,B) coordination. The following counterexample shows
this.
Example 1: Consider the embedding belief system satisfying the following: T ?1 =
{1} and T ?2 = {1, 2}. The probability distribution ρ? over T ? assigns a probability
1−  to (1, 1) and  to (1, 2), where  > 0 is negligibly small. (ρ? is as depicted in
Table 3. The row is the rationality type of Player1 whereas the columns are those
of Player2.) For each player i, ai(1, ti) = A for all ti ∈ Ti. And a2(2, t2) = B for
all t2 ∈ T2. Then Player1 is rational everywhere. And Player2 is rational at (1, 1),
and irrational at (1, 2). Thus #MKR(s) = 0 for any s ∈ Ω?. Because Player1 is
never sure that Player2 is rational. On the other hand, Player1’ s rationality is
common knowledge.8 Note that for any s ∈ Ω, s ∈ CKE˜. Now look at any s ∈ Ω?
satisfying t? = (1, 1) and t1, t2 ≥ 1. It is satisfied that #MKPβ(s) > #MKR(s).
But neither player takes the action B. 2
Table 3: A counterexample
1 2
1 1−  
Proof of Theorem 1: Index those elements of T that ρ gives positive probabilities
as follows: Let t ∈ T . Let h = t1 + t2. Then refer to t as t(h).
Let s ∈ Ω?.
(i) Assume t1, t2 ≥ 1. Say t = t(h). Then by Lemma 9, #MKPβ(s) = h − 1.
Suppose that #MKR(s) ≥ h− 1. Then Lemma 7 implies that on any path from
8In the case of Example 1, common (1 − )-belief of rationality holds at any s ∈ Ω? with
t? = (1, 1). See Monderer and Samet (1989) for the concept of common p-belief.
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s whose length is not more than h − 1, both players are rational. Assume for
each i = 1, 2, ai(si) = B. Then applying Lemma 10 repeatedly, we obtain a path
(sν)h−1ν=0 such that for some i = 1, 2, letting j 6= i,
s0 = s,
s1i = s
0
i , and t
1 = t(h−1),
s2j = s
1
j , and t
2 = t(h−2),
...
sh−22 = s
h−3
2 , and t
h−2 = t(2),
sh−11 = s
h−2
1 , and t
h−1 = t(1),
where for each ν = 0, 1, · · · , h − 1 and each k = 1, 2, we have ak(sνk) = B. Note
that the length of the path is h− 1 and both players are rational at any point on
this path. By Lemma 8, the assumption s ∈ CKE˜ implies sh−1 ∈ CKE˜. Thus at
sh−1 Player2 knows if t1 = 0, a1 = A. Note that th−12 = 0. Then by (ii) of Lemma
10, the rationality of Player2 at sh−1 implies a2(sh−12 ) = A. This is a contradiction.
(ii) Assume t = (1, 0). The assumption s ∈ CKE˜ implies that at s Player2 knows
that if t1 = 0, a1 = A. Thus Lemma 10 (ii) implies a2(s2) = A.
s ∈ CKE˜ implies that Player 1 knows that Player2 knows that if t1 = 0,
a1 = A. Thus at s Player1 knows that if t2 = 0, a2 = A. Then Lemma 10 (i)
implies a1(s1) = A. Thus it never be the case that for each i = 1, 2, ai(si) = B.
2
Assuming common knowledge of rationality, Theorem 1 leads to the “paradox-
ical behavior” as observed in Rubinstein (1989). Corollary 1 below asserts that
provided that Player1 choosing A for the payoff type 0 is common knowledge, if
common knowledge of rationality obtains, then both players must choose A for all
payoff types. Denote by Eˆ the event {s ∈ Ω | for each i = 1, 2,ai(si) = A}.
Corollary 1: CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ ⊂ Eˆ.
Note that CKR∩CKE˜ ∈ F?. Thus Corollary 1 implies that if (t?1, t1, t?2, t2) ∈
CKR ∩ CKE˜, then for any t′ ∈ T , we have (t?1, t′1, t?2, t′2) ∈ CKR ∩ CKE˜, thus
(t?1, t
′
1, t
?
2, t
′
2) ∈ CKEˆ. In other words, if at a SOW s, the component t? of s is
such that R and E˜ are both common knowledge (the component t is irrelevant),
then each Player i takes the action A for all ti, and this is common knowledge.
Proof: Let us denote for i = 1, 2, Eˆi = {s ∈ Ω | ai(si) = A}. We will prove
CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ in (i) and (ii) in the below, and prove CKEˆ ⊂ Eˆ in (iii).
Let s ∈ CKR ∩ CKE˜ be given.
(i) We prove CKR ∩CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ2. First we show CKR ∩CKE˜ ⊂ Eˆ2 in (a) in
the below. And we point out CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ2 in (b).
(a) Suppose a2(s2) = B. By Lemma 3, s ∈ CKR implies Player2 is rational
at s. Then Lemma 10 (ii) implies that there exists some s′ ∈ Ω? such that s′2 = s2
and a1(s′1) = B. On the other hand, since we have #MKR(s) = ∞, Theorem
1 implies for any s′ ∈ Ω? such that s′2 = s2, we have a1(s′1) = A. This is a
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contradiction.
(b) By (a) in the above, we have CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ Eˆ2. Lemma 1 implies
CKR ∩ CKE˜ = CK(R ∩ E˜). Then Lemma 2 implies K1CK(R ∩ E˜) ⊂ K1Eˆ2.
Note that K1CK(R∩E˜) = CK(R∩E˜) by Lemma 6. Then we have CK(R∩E˜) ⊂
K1Eˆ2. Repeating the same argument, for any positive integer m, we can obtain
CK(R ∩ E˜) ⊂ KmEˆ2. This implies CK(R ∩ E˜) ⊂ CKEˆ2.
(ii) We prove CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ1.
(a) Assume t1 = 0. By Lemma 3, s ∈ CKE˜ implies a1(s1) = A.
(b) Assume t1 ≥ 1. Since we have proved in the above that CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂
CKEˆ2, Player1 knows at s that a2 = A. Also s ∈ CKR and Lemma 3 imply
Player1 is rational at s. Then Lemma 10 (i) implies a1(s1) = A.
(c) Similarly to (i) (b) above, we obtain CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ1.
Now we have CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ1 ∩ CKEˆ2. Then Lemma 1 implies
CKR ∩ CKE˜ ⊂ CKEˆ.
(iii) We show that CKEˆ ⊂ Eˆ. Suppose that there exists some SOW s such that
s ∈ CKEˆ and s 6∈ Eˆ. The latter implies for some i = 1, 2, s 6∈ Eˆi. Then since
Eˆi ∈ Fi, Lemma 3 implies s 6∈ KiEˆi. On the other hand, the former (s ∈ CKEˆ)
implies s ∈ KiEˆi. This is a contradiction.
2
Now consider the case where there is only one rationality type profile (i.e. T ?
is a singleton) in Corollary 1. Then we obtain the result in Rubinstein (1989)
which appeared in Section 1.1. Because now the behavior of (a1,a2) induces only
one strategy profile of the e-mail game. Then common knowledge of rationality
implies that it constitutes a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the e-mail game.
Corollary 2 (Rubinstein 1989): Let (σ1, σ2) be a strategy profile of the e-mail
game. Assume σ1(0) = A. Then (σ1, σ2) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and
only if for each i = 1, 2, for all t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · ·}, σi(t) = A.
2.2 Special case
In the previous subsection, we gave a necessary condition for the (B,B) coordi-
nation by rational players under the assumption that “Player1 chooses the action
A for the payoff type 0” is common knowledge. But as seen in Example 1, the
condition is not sufficient for the coordination. Here we show that there is a class
of embedding belief systems where the condition is also sufficient. Theorem 2 in
the below states this.
Theorem 2: Let an even positive integer m be given. Then there exists an em-
bedding belief system B(G) which satisfies the following:
(i) For any s ∈ Ω, s ∈ CKE˜.
(ii) For any s ∈ Ω? ∩ R, we have #MKPβ(s) > #MKR(s) if and only if
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ai(s1) = B for each i = 1, 2.
(iii) For any k with 0 ≤ k ≤ m, there exists some s ∈ Ω? at which #MKR(s) = k.
(iv) For any s ∈ Ω?, #MKR(s) ≤ m.
Note that Theorem 2 (ii), (iii) and (iv) are concerned only with what happens
at possible SOWs. Theorem 2 asserts the existence of an embedding belief system
in which at any SOW, it is common knowledge that Player1 chooses the action A
for the rationality type 0, and at any possible SOW where each player is rational,
the (B,B) coordination occurs if and only if the upper bound order of mutual
knowledge of “the true payoff matrix is β” exceeds the upper bound order of
mutual knowledge of rationality. Moreover, in the embedding belief system, mutual
knowledge of rationality can obtain at any order up to some given number.
In the following, we give a recipe for constructing embedding belief systems
that are to satisfy the properties (i)-(iv) in the statement of Theorem 2. And then
we prove these embedding belief systems actually satisfy these properties.
Construction: Let a positive integer K be given. Then fix any embedding belief
system that satisfies the following (1)-(3). Let us call this embedding belief system
BK(G).
(1) T ?1 = {1, 2, · · · ,K}, and
T ?2 = {0, 1, 2, · · · ,K}.
(2) The functions ai(i = 1, 2) satisfy for any s ∈ Ω,
ai(t?i , ti) = A if 0 ≤ ti < t?i , and
ai(t?i , ti) = B otherwise.
e.g. Let t?i = 4.
Then Player i takes the actions
ai(4, 0) = A,
ai(4, 1) = A,
ai(4, 2) = A,
ai(4, 3) = A,
ai(4, 4) = B, ← switching from A to B
ai(4, 5) = B,
ai(4, 6) = B,
...
(3) The probability distribution ρ? over T ? satisfies the following:
(i) For any t? ∈ T ?, ρ?(t?) > 0 if and only if t?1 = t?2 or t?1 = t?2 + 1.
(ii) Let t? ∈ T ? be such that ρ?(t?) > 0. Denote t? by t?(h) where h = t?1+t?2.
Then ρ? satisfies ρ
?(t?(h))
ρ?(t?(h+1))
≥ L−(1−ε)M(2−ε)M for each h = 1, 2, · · · , 2K. 2
Example 2: Table 4 depicts the shape of the set T ? for the case K = 3. The
rows are the rationality types of Player1 whereas the columns are those of Player2.
16
t?(h)(h = 1, 2, · · · , 6) are the rationality type profiles that are assigned positive
probabilities. Note that they exhibit a “zigzag” structure. 2
Table 4: A embedding belief system
0 1 2 3
1 t?(1) t?(2)
2 t?(3) t?(4)
3 t?(5) t?(6)
Now we show the embedding belief system BK(G) satisfies the properties in
Theorem 2 with an appropriate choice of the number K.
Lemma 11: Let K be a positive integer. Let BK(G) be given. Then the event R
equals {s ∈ Ω | t?2 6= 0}.
Paraphrasing, Lemma 11 says that in BK(G), Player2 is not rational if her
rationality type is 0, and is rational otherwise, and that Player1 is rational every-
where.
Proof: In the following, we will first prove that both players are rational in
{s ∈ Ω | t?2 6= 0} ((i) and (ii) in the below). Then we will show that Player2 is not
rational outside of {s ∈ Ω | t?2 6= 0} ((iii) in the below).
Let s ∈ Ω be given.
(i) We show that Player1 is rational at t?1. Then all we have to do is check that
Player1 is pointwise rational at the type (t?1, t˜1) for each t˜1 = 0, 1, 2, · · ·. Denote
k = t?1. The construction (3) of BK(G) implies that at (t?1, t˜1), Player1 knows
t?2 = k − 1 or k, thus he knows that a2 = B if t2 ≥ k, and that a2 = A if
t2 ≤ k − 2. We examine three cases.
(a) Assume t˜1 ≥ k + 1. Then at (t?1, t˜1), Player1 knows t2 ≥ k, thus he knows
a2 = B. Also he knows that the true payoff matrix is β. Thus at this type of
Player1, his best reply is the action B. The construction (2) says that Player1
indeed takes B at this type. Thus Player1 is pointwise rational at (t?1, t˜1) with
t˜1 ≥ k + 1.
(b) Assume t˜1 ≤ k−1. At (t?1, t˜1), Player1 knows t2 = t˜1 or t˜1−1. If t2 = t˜1−1,
then t2 ≤ k − 2. Thus he knows that a2 = A if t2 = t˜1 − 1. Thus by Lemma
10 (i), the best reply of Player1 at this type is the action A. The construction
(2) says that Player1 indeed does so. Thus Player1 is pointwise rational at (t?1, t˜1)
with t˜1 ≤ k − 1.
(c) Assume t˜1 = k. Since k ≥ 1, at (t?1, t˜1) Player1 knows that the true
payoff matrix is β. And at this type, Player1 believes t2 = k − 1 with probability
1
1+(1−ε) , and t2 = k with probability
1−ε
1+(1−ε) . Also Player1 believes t
?
2 = k − 1
with probability ρ?(k, k − 1)/γ, and t?2 = k with probability ρ?(k, k)/γ, where
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γ = ρ?(k, k−1)+ρ?(k, k). The construction (2) implies a2(t?2, t2) = B if (t?2, t2) =
(k−1, k−1), (k−1, k), (k, k), and a2(t?2, t2) = A if (t?2, t2) = (k, k−1). Thus at this
type, Player1 believes a2 = B with probability 1γ {ρ?(k, k − 1) + ρ?(k, k) 1−ε1+(1−ε)},
and a2 = A with probability
ρ?(k,k)
γ
1
1+(1−ε) . Note that by the construction (3),
ρ?(k,k−1)
ρ?(k,k) ≥ L−(1−ε)M(2−ε)M . Thus µ(a2=B|(t
?
1 ,t˜1))
µ(a2=A|(t?1 ,t˜1))
≥ L−(1−ε)M(2−ε)M {1 + (1 − ε)} + (1 − ε).
Denote q = L−(1−ε)M(2−ε)M (1+ (1− ε))+ (1− ε). Then Eg1(B,a2 | (t?1, t˜1)) ≥ q1+qM +
1
1+q (−L). A simple calculation shows q1+qM + 11+q (−L) = 0. On the other hand,
Eg1(A,a2 | (t?1, t˜1)) = 0. The construction (2) says that Player1 takes B at this
type. Thus Player1 is pointwise rational at (t?1, t˜1) with t˜1 = k.
Now we conclude that Player1 is pointwise rational at (t?1, t˜1) for each t˜1 =
0, 1, 2 · · ·.
(ii) We show that Player2 is rational at t?2 if t
?
2 ≥ 1. Assume t?2 ≥ 1. Then all we
have to do is check that Player2 is pointwise rational at the type (t?2, t˜2) for each
t˜2 = 0, 1, 2, · · ·. Denote k = t?2. The construction (3) of BK(G) implies that at
(t?2, t˜2), Player2 knows t
?
1 = k or k + 1, thus she knows that a1 = B if t1 ≥ k + 1,
and that a1 = A if t1 ≤ k − 1. We examine three cases.
(a) Assume t˜2 ≥ k + 1. Then at (t?2, t˜2), Player2 knows t1 ≥ k + 1, thus she
knows a1 = B. Also she knows that the true payoff matrix is β. Thus at this
type, Player2’s best reply is the action B. The construction (2) says that Player2
indeed takes B at this type. Thus Player2 is pointwise rational at (t?2, t˜2) with
t˜2 ≥ k + 1.
(b) Assume t˜2 ≤ k − 1. Then at (t?2, t˜2), Player2 knows t1 = t˜2 or t˜2 + 1. If
t1 = t˜2, then t1 ≤ k − 1. Thus she knows a1 = A if t1 = t˜2. Thus by Lemma 10
(ii) , the best reply of Player2 at this type is the action A. The construction says
that Player2 indeed does so. Thus Player2 is pointwise rational at (t?2, t˜2) with
t˜2 ≤ k − 1.
(c) Assume t˜2 = k. Since we have assumed t?2 ≥ 1, at (t?2, t˜2) Player2 knows
that the true payoff matrix is β. And at this type, Player2 believes t1 = k
with probability 11+(1−ε) , and t1 = k + 1 with probability
1−ε
1+(1−ε) . Also Player2
believes t?1 = k with probability ρ
?(k, k)/γ, and t?1 = k + 1 with probability
ρ?(k + 1, k)/γ, where γ = ρ?(k, k) + ρ?(k + 1, k). The construction (2) implies
a1(t?1, t1) = B if (t
?
1, t1) = (k, k), (k, k + 1), (k + 1, k + 1), and a1(t
?
1, t1) = A if
(t?1, t1) = (k + 1, k). Thus at this type, Player2 believes a1 = B with probability
1
γ {ρ?(k, k) + ρ?(k + 1, k) 1−ε1+(1−ε)}, and a1 = A with probability ρ
?(k+1,k)
γ
1
1+(1−ε) .
Then the similar argument to (i)(c) in the above applies to conclude that Player2,
who indeed takes the action B, is pointwise rational at (t?2, t˜2) with t˜2 = k.
Now we conclude that Player2 is pointwise rational at each (t?2, t˜2) with t
?
2 ≥ 1
and t˜2 = 0, 1, 2, · · ·.
(iii) Finally, we show that Player2 is not rational at t?2 with t
?
2 = 0. Assume
t?2 = 0. Let t˜2 = 0. Then at (t
?
2, t˜2), Player2 knows t
?
1 = 1 and t1 = 0 or 1. By the
construction (2) of BK(G), she knows at this type that a1 = A if t1 = 0. Then
Lemma 10 (ii) implies Player2’s best reply is the action A. But the construction
(2) says that Player2 takes the action B. Thus she is not pointwise rational. This
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implies that she is not rational at any (t?2, t2) with t
?
2 = 0.
2
Lemma 12: Let K be a positive integer. Let BK(G) be given. Let s ∈ Ω? ∩ R.
Then #MKR(s) = t?1 + t
?
2 − 2.
Proof: Following the construction (3) (ii) of BK(G), index those elements of T ?
that ρ? gives positive probabilities. Let s ∈ Ω? ∩ R. Then say t?’s index is h i.e.
t? = t?(h) Note that h = t?1 + t
?
2. Consider a path (s
ν)h−1ν=0 such that
s0 = s,
s1 = (t?(h−1)1 , t1, t
?(h−1)
2 , t2),
s2 = (t?(h−2)1 , t1, t
?(h−2)
2 , t2),
...
sh−1 = (t?(1)1 , t1, t
?(1)
2 , t2).
Note that t?(1) = (1, 0). Then by Lemma 11, s0, s1, · · · , sh−2 ∈ R and sh−1 6∈ R.
Clearly, this is the shortest path from s to some possible SOW outside R, and its
length is h− 1. Then Lemma 7 implies #MKR(s) = h− 2 = t?1 + t?2 − 2. 2
Proof of Theorem 2: Let K satisfy m = 2(K − 1). And let BK(G) be given.
Then in the following, we see that BK(G) satisfies all of the properties (i)-(iv).
Proof of (i): By the construction of BK(G), we have Ω = E˜. Thus E˜ is common
knowledge at any s ∈ Ω.
Proof of (ii): (if) Let s ∈ Ω?∩R. Then by (i), s ∈ CKE˜. Then applying Theorem
1, we have the desired conclusion.
(only if) Let s ∈ Ω?∩R. Assume #MKPβ(s) > #MKR(s). Then by Lemma
9, #MKPβ(s) = t1 + t2 − 1. Also by Lemma 12, #MKR(s) = t?1 + t?2 − 2. Thus
we have t1 + t2 − 1 > t?1 + t?2 − 2. Now it remains to see ti ≥ t?i for each i = 1, 2
from the above inequality. Then we will conclude ai(si) = B for each i = 1, 2 by
the construction (2) of BK(G). Recall that [t1 = t2 or t1 = t2 + 1] and [t?1 = t?2 or
t?1 = t
?
2 + 1] . So there are four cases:
(a) Assume t1 = t2 and t?1 = t
?
2. We plug these equalities into the above
inequality. Then we have 2t1 − 1 > 2t?1 − 2. This implies t1 ≥ t?1 and thus t2 ≥ t?2.
(b) Assume t1 = t2 and t?1 = t
?
2 + 1. Then we have 2t1 − 1 > 2t?1 − 3. This
implies t1 ≥ t?1. Also we have 2t2 − 1 > 2t?2 − 1. Thus t2 > t?2.
(c) Assume t1 = t2 + 1 and t?1 = t
?
2. Then we have 2t1 − 2 > 2t?1 − 2. This
implies t1 > t?1. Also we have 2t2 > 2t
?
2 − 2. This implies t2 ≥ t?2.
(d) Assume t1 = t2 + 1 and t?1 = t
?
2 + 1. Then we have 2t1 − 2 > 2t?1 − 3. This
implies t1 ≥ t?1. Also we have 2t2 > 2t?2 − 1. This implies t2 ≥ t?2.
Proofs of (iii) and (iv): Immediate from Lemma 12.
2
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3 Concluding Remarks
3.1 Degree of irrationality in the embedding belief systems
BK(G)
For the embedding belief systems BK(G) that we have constructed in Section 2.2,
we want to establish that the smaller the risk of the coordination behavior,
the smaller the degree of irrationality that we need to introduce.
L
M represents the relative loss arising from the failure of the (B,B) coordination
to the player who have chosen the action B. Also, ε is the probability with which
a signal gets lost. So when the “e-mail communication” has stopped, from the
viewpoint of one player, the smaller ε is, the larger the probability with which the
last signal the player sent has arrived. Thus these two parameters are considered
representing the risk of the coordination behavior: the larger these numbers are,
the larger the risk.9
On the other hand, we can calculate the “minimum degree of irrationality” that
we need in order to have BK(G): Let θ denote (2−ε)ML−(1−ε)M . Note that 0 < θ < ∞.
Then by the formula in the construction (3) (ii) of BK(G), θ represents the the
upper bound of the ratio ρ
?(t?(h+1))
ρ?(t?(h))
. Let QNR(θ,K) denote the minimum prior
probability that at least one player is not rational. Then QNR(θ,K) =
1/(
∑2K
p=1 θ
p−1). We regard that this number indicates the minimum degree of
irrationality in need.10
We have two convergence results where the irrationality is vanishing: (i) For a
fixed K with K ≥ 2, if LM goes to 1 and ε goes to 0 at the same time, which means
the risk of the coordination goes to the minimum, then the minimum degree of
irrationality goes to 0. (ii) For fixed LM and ε that satisfy θ ≥ 1, the minimum
degree of irrationality goes to 0 as K becomes larger.
We have another convergence result where the irrationality persists: (iii) For
fixed LM and ε that satisfy 0 < θ < 1, the minimum degree of irrationality goes to
1− θ as K becomes larger.
We note that the effect of LM is significant as an indicator of the risk: Regardless
of the value of ε, as LM becomes larger, that means the risk of the coordination
becomes higher, θ goes to 0 thus QNR goes to 1. On the other hand, the effect of
ε as an indicator of the risk is not as severe as that of LM : When
L
M goes to 1 (that
means a small risk) at the same time ε goes to 12 (that means a high risk), the
value of θ goes to 3, which is larger than 1 so that QNR goes to 0 as K becomes
larger.
We also note that as K becomes larger, the maximum of the minimum num-
bers of signals that players should require for the coordination behavior becomes
9Recall L > M > 0 and 0 < ε < 1
2
by assumption.
10We should also look at “the minimum prior probability that no mutual knowledge of ratio-
nality obtains” as another reasonable indicator of the degree of irrationality. But expressing this
number is complicated. So we do not adopt this number. However, instead we could look at “the
prior probability that no mutual knowledge of rationality obtains when the degree of irrationality
is at the minimum,” which equals (1 + θ)/(
∑2K
p=1
θp−1). The behavior of this number is similar
to that of QNR.
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larger.11 Thus for fixed LM and ε, as we demand the smaller degree of the mini-
mum irrationality (that requires the larger K), the desired coordination becomes
harder in the sense that it may require more communication.
In summing up, when the risk of the coordination behavior is small, in partic-
ular L is not very large relative to M , a small degree of irrationality suffices to
have the embedding belief systems BK(G). Also, as we accept the larger K, the
necessary degree of irrationality becomes smaller but the coordination becomes
harder. And when L is very large, the risk of coordination is very high and we
need a significant degree of irrationality.
3.2 Interpretation of the embedding belief systems BK(G)
On the interpretation of the embedding belief systems BK(G) we have constructed
in Section 2.2, it is worth noting the following. Firstly, in BK(G), at any SOW,
it is common knowledge that each player switches the scheduled action from A
to B before sending K + 1 signals. This might be interpreted that “K signals is
many enough to attempt the coordination behavior” is understood as a “common
practice” in the environment in which these players play the game.
Secondly, the “zigzag” structure of the positive probability points in T ? is es-
sentially similar to the knowledge structure in the e-mail game. (Compare Table
2 and Table 4.) Thus we might be able to interpret that knowledge about ra-
tionality is shared by the players by some communication process similar to the
“e-mail communication.” However, we have not specified this communication pro-
cess in this paper. We just suggest here that studying communication processes
of sharing knowledge about rationality in general be a research theme for future.
We believe this direction of research is important for the following reason. A
standard assumption in game theory says that the rationality of players is com-
mon knowledge.12 But it is rarely discussed how players can obtain information
about the rationality of players. If one says it is common knowledge, how have
players commonized the knowledge of rationality? And if there is some “proto-
col” that commonizes the knowledge about rationality, one should also consider
the cases where the “protocol” breaks down. Our analysis suggests that it does
matter how players acquire the knowledge (or beliefs) of rationality in particular
when it is not common knowledge. In fact, it has been argued in many places
that some counterintuitive results about rational behavior (in particular those of
backward induction such as the “centipede game” as in Rosenthal (1982) or the
finitely repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma) are much concerned with the fact that we
cannot completely rule out irrationality in reality. Thus we believe that we should
examine how players obtain information about rationality.
3.3 Paradoxical feature of the e-mail game
We refer to the literature that does not consider the e-mail game really paradoxical.
In particular, we mention that Morris (2002) argues for that the e-mail game
11In BK(G), if the rationality type profile is t?, then each player needs at least t?i signals sent
to take the action B. Thus ti is the minimum number of signals required for the coordination
behavior. And the maximum value of t?i is K.
12putting aside the theories of evolutionary games and bounded rationality.
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paradox is not really paradoxical in the sense that it calls for some “resolution” by
considering bounded rationality. He says that he rather defends the view that the
e-mail game and similar paradoxical examples are “a sensible starting point for
modelling the role of higher order beliefs in applied settings,” and he mentioned
financial markets, bank runs and exchange rate crises as examples of areas for
applications.
In this paper we have started with the view that the e-mail game poses a
“paradox” that should need a resolution. However, our conclusion does not con-
tradict the view of of Morris (2002) mentioned above. Our results suggest that
the paradoxical behavior may be resolved when the order of mutual knowledge of
rationality is suitably bounded. Thus our position is compatible with the view
that the e-mail game does not need to be paradoxical when it is applied to situa-
tions in which assuming (approximate) common knowledge of rationality (mutual
knowledge of sufficiently high orders or common belief of rationality with suffi-
ciently high probabilities) is plausible. On the other hand, our results say that in
environments where relatively small orders of mutual knowledge of rationality is
expected, players’ behavior does not need to be compatible with the paradoxical
equilibrium, and the (B,B) coordination is likely for some cases. In those cases,
what matters is the structures of players’ information about rationality.
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